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ABSTRACT 
History QUASSHed, 1957-1980, forthcoming in American Behavioral Scientist, 
. Social s cientists and historians trained in social science 
began importing quantitative methods and explicit models into history in 
the late 1950s, At first, many disciplinary leaders stoutly res isted 
the trend, but in the 1960s and 70s the major historical j ournals became 
increasingly receptive to statistical and mathematical pieces and the 
range and importance of work by quantifiers became impossible for historians 
to ignore, What defines the new subfield, how healthy is it, and where is 
it likely to go in the future? A review o f  recent work on critical 
elections , geographic mobility, and postbellum Southern economic history 
suggests that QUAntitative Social Scientific History (QUASSH) has the 
usual adoles cent traumas, but that the diagnosis is favorable and the 
recommended therapy is an increase in the time spent contemplating the 
connections between theory and methods and more contact with mainline 
historians, 
History QUASSHed, 1957-1980* 
History is different from the other social sciences . Nine 
contrasting qualities have p roduced a striking variation between the 
course o f  development of quantitative methods in history and that in the 
rest of the social scientific disciplines, First, historians have 
framed less compelling research agendas, and feel less constrained 
by the ones which have been proposed than do professionals in other 
fields . Historians borrow, rather than invent theories ; prize diversity 
of insight more than coherence ; paradoxically, are more attracted by 
interpretations which claim to overturn or replace older ones entirely, 
rather than those which stress their continuity with previous structures 
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o f  understanding . I f  historians are often classified as belonging to 
one "school" or another, the underlying educational philosophy is 
decidedly p rogressive, the assignments only roughly structured, the 
disc ipline very loose . 
Second, historians classify themselves by area and period, 
more than by topic or technique . We call ourselves specialists in the 
antebellum South, the Renaissance and Reformation, or modern Japan ; we 
very rarely advertise j ob openings in categories analogous to applied 
microeconomic theory, deviant behavior, or minority group relations 
(Tilly, 1979, pp . 28, 45). A historian of one area or period may 
therefore p roceed in blissful ignorance, at least up to a point, of  
technical advances outside his subfield . Third, and closely related 
*I want to thank my col league Lance E. Davis for forcing me to
clarify some of my murky thinking and for warning me of some of the 
gravest of my errors. He is hereby absolved from further responslbility. 
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to the second point, we have no widely recognized subdisciplines in 
theory or methodology . In its Guide to Departments of History, 1979-80, 
for instance, the American Historical Associations1s chart on the 
specialties of each department includes geographical and period rubrics 
only (AHA, 1980, pp . 384-415). Thus, there are no niches in which 
those primarily interested in theory or methods can abide comfortably. 
They must be specialists in substance, part-timers in everything else . 
Fourth, historians are less likely than other social scientists 
to speed the development o f  an area by collaborating or even directly 
competing with each other ( Fogel, 1979, p .  35) . It appears to be 
fairly common in other social sciences for complementary collaborators 
to match up -- a theorist or methodologist with a person more interested 
in the substance of a problem . Moreover, a challenging p roblem or 
appealing topic attracts droves o f  sociologists, economists, or political 
scientist�, who seem to coexist relatively cheerfully with others 
working on the same issue ; a rumor that another historian is working 
on a particular subj ect, on the other hand, is likely to b ring a stern 
letter warning o f f  the territorial intruder, or a frantic competition, 
often detrimental to the resulting quality of scholarship on both s ides, 
to get published first. 
Fifth, the best historians, to a markedly greater extent than 
the best sociologists or psychologists, still pride themselves on the 
ability to craft their writings not j ust clearly, but elegantly . Tables, 
equations, the use of phrases defined by common convention may foster 
precision, but they sully prose, and many historians prefer inexactness 
to stylistic compromise (Barzun, 1974, pp . 40, 105, 109; Landes and 
Tilly, 1971, pp. 11-13). Sixth, many historians claim not merely an 
aversion to, but an absolute incapacity for mathematics . Curiously, 
such claims arise perhaps most often from those who deal most in 
abstractions, the intellectual historians. 
If these six traits have impeded the adoption of numerical 
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techniques in history, compared to the progress in other social sciences, 
three other disciplinary characteristics, two of them facets of the first 
six, have boosted quantification. For one thing, historians seem even 
more willing than other social scientists to adopt hypotheses and methods 
from outside their discipline . Thus, one of the f ield ' s  leading publications, 
The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, is something of a crazyquilt 
of articles which blend history with anthropology, economics, political 
science, psychology or psychoanalysis, or sociology . For another thing, 
because it lacks a core o f  traditional theory or methodology, history 
tends to be somewhat more subj ect to fads, to be more malleable and open 
to innovations than its sister social sciences. The successful application 
of an approach often inspires widespread emulation -- in slightly 
different areas or periods, of course . Consequently, a few heralded 
illustrations of the usefulness of quantitative techniques in history 
were enough to incite many others to make similar attempts . For a 
third thing, historians have a fetish for thoroughness, for completeness . 
A historical reviewer ' s  comment that the author of a book has failed to 
examine a relevant document collection or ignored another scholar ' s  
pertinent work is considered devastating . Historians have therefore 
found unanswerable the argument that by neglecting quantifiable sources , 
which could only be fully exploited with complicated statistical 
techniques, they were failing to exhaust all the resources at hand . 
Although these comparisons should not be pushed too far, for 
all social scientists share the historians ' qualities in varying, if 
somewhat lesser degrees, they do point towards an explanation of both 
the willingness of groups of historians to try to quantify and the 
inability o f  quantifiers to gain dominance in most fields o f  history . 
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Quantification came to history late and it came from outside 
2 the discipline. In 1957, Lee Benson, a historian schooled in sociology,
published a sweeping critique of "impressionistic" treatments of 
nineteenth-century American elections and called for historians to 
expand their definition of primary sources beyond newspapers and 
manuscripts to include quantifiable data. Four years later Benson 
added practice to preachment, relying heavily on a quantitative analysis 
of election returns to p�oduce a brilliant and original interpretation 
of American politics in the 1830s and 40s . In a paper delivered in 
1957 , two Harvard economists, Alfred H .  Conrad and John R .  Meyer, 
reinvigorated the discussion of an old historical problem and initiated 
the new "econometric history" by demonstrating the profitability both 
of slavery and of applying modern economic theory and techniques to 
history . By 1960, the "cliometricians," as they were j ibingly labeled, 
were holding annual conferences at Purdue to coordinate research efforts 
and criticize each other ' s  papers. A year before, the historian Merle 
Curti, assisted by several other historians and his psychologist wife 
Margaret, published a quantitative historical study o f  community social 
structure and mobility, which, along with the work of Stephan Thernstrom, 
inspired legions of students to take up the "new social history" 
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(Benson, 1972 and 1961 ; Conrad and Meyer, in Fogel and Engerman, 1971; 
Curti, 1959) , 
The response by the his torical profession ' s  elite was rapid, 
but by no means single-minded . To the sometimes s t rident demands o f  
the devotees of the new history that traditionally-trained his torians 
"retool, rethink, reform, or be plowed under," as one older economic 
historian caricatured the new program, some historians at firs t reacted 
with fright, irrationality, and something close to panic . Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr. , whose description of Whig and Jacksonian electoral 
coalitions had failed Benson's systematic numerical tests, retreated 
behind a hastily-erected wall o f  dogma. "Almost all important questions," 
Schlesinger proclaimed, "are important precisely because they are not 
susceptible to quantitative answers . "  I n  a presidential address t o  the 
American His torical Association, Carl Bridenbaugh issued a j eremiad 
against the infiltrating pries ts  of the new religion, warning his fellow 
historians never to "worship at the shrine of that Bitch-goddess, 
QUANTIFICATION " (all quoted in Woodward, 1968, pp . 29-30). 
Others kep t their wits a bit better, declaring the his torical 
faith broad enough to encompass another sect . Reminding his readers 
that enthusiasm for social s cience had repeatedly waxed and waned within 
the American historical profession in the twentiet h  century, C. Vann 
Woodward suggested that "rhetorical indignation and the neo-Luddite 
posture of our conservatives are no t effec tive responses, Smashing 
computers is no t quite the answer. "  If Woodward seemed to yearn for a 
revolution which would overthrow the con temporary regime of historical 
craftsmen who were "even more addicted than those of earlier generations 
II h to over-specialization and narrowness o f  subj ect matter, w ose
"monumental patience" produced such "unimpressive conclusions," he was 
• f ictory and skeptical o fdoubtful of the revolutionaries prospects or V 
J their u topian visions (Woodward, 1968, PP· 30, 24) . 
A third response to the social s cientific proselytizers, 
especially popular among graduate students and younger historians, was 
fraternization and usually timid -- collaboration . Thus, a 
d his torian Who found Guttman scaling helpful in traditionally-t raine 
his study of the mid-nineteenth century British Parliament, William O. 
Aydelo tte, nevertheless carefully qualified his endorsement o f  the use 
i th d "Quantification," he remarked in a s e t  o f  of quantitat v e  m e  o s .  
essays advocating its  employment in historical study "is merely an 
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1 f 1 that Can. for certain classes of questions, ancillary too , one o severs , 
be o f  some help . "  From 1965 to 1970, 120 historians, many o f  them no 
less hesitant than Aydelotte, attended swmner s eminars in historical 
data analysis at the University of Michigan (Aydelotte, 1971, p .  34; 
Swierenga, 1970, p. 5) , 
Nonetheless, by 1970 there seemed to be a lull in the 
date it Was Virtually impossible for traditionalis ts Methodenstrei t . By that 
to deny the significance o f  the research published by the "new" political 
and social historians; 
swep t  all before them . 
while in economic history, the cliometricians had 
The econometric his torians were powerful enough 
to take over the s t rongest disciplinary journal, the Journal of Economic 
History; their social and political counterparts started new ones -- the 
Journal of Social History (1967), Historical Methods (1967), and the 
i (1970) In both range and depth, .Journal of In terdisciplinary H st� • 
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the body of work based on the analysis of quantitative data was impressive. 
In political history, the "ethnocul tural thesis" rested on examinations 
of patterns of voting returns in ethnically and religiously homogeneous 
geographic areas; the theory of "critical elections , "  on correlations of 
election returns by area across time; and various hypotheses about the 
behavior of particular legislative bodies, on Gut tman scaling and factor 
analyses o f  roll calls (Benson, 1961 ; Kleppner, 1970;  Holt, 1969 ; 
Formisano, 1971 ; Burnham, 1970; Aydelot te, 1963 ; Silbey, 1967; Alexander, 
1967), In social history, scholars tabulated the extent to which individual 
family heads remained in the same area or the same occupational rank 
over time; demographers charted changes in marriage, birth, and death 
rat es, as well as in family size and type; while o ther social historians 
graphed patterns of weal th and landholdings and alterations in those 
pat terns (Thernstrom, 1964 ; Demos, 1969;  Greven, 1970 ; Lockridge, 
1970 ; Main, 1965) . Economic histo rians used statistical techniques and 
neoclassical theory in their often strikingly novel treatments of economic 
growth, slavery, human and nonhuman capital formation, demographic and 
technological change, and fiscal and monetary policy {Fogel and 
Engerman, 1967). More selfconsciously theoretical than the o thers, the 
new economic historians developed the explicit counterfactual model. 
Usually trained as economists, they sprinkled their work liberally with 
regression equations and complex supply and demand curves (Fogel, 1967 ; 
Davis, in Taylor and Ellsworth, 1971). By contrast, scholars in the 
other two fields typically identified themselves with the concerns and more 
lit erary style of history, in which most of them had received their degrees. 
By the end of the 1960s, then, a growing band of quan tifiers had moved 
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beyond propagandizing and built a scholarly edifice which was grand 
enough to inspire a new review article industry (Bogue, 1968; Clubb 
and Allen, 1967; Rothstein, 1970;  Fogel and Engerman, 1967) . 
During the 1970s, quantification became almost respectable in 
the discipline. Several books which relied largely on numerical evidence 
won major prizes (Hackney, 1969 ; Alexander and Beringer, 1972; Lemon, 
1972 ; Thernst rom, 197 3 ;  Fogel and Engerman, 197 4 ;  Sco t t, 1974). A 
new organization, the Social Science History Association, was launched, 
attracted members, held conventions, produced a j ournal. Mainstream 
organs of the profession added tables to the usual prose, and increasingly 
published no t j ust  counts, but regressions, correlations, even factor 
analyses. The number of tables per page in five leading historical 
j ournals increased five-fold from the early 1960s to the late 1970s, 
and the proportion of these tables which were based on more than simple 
counts rose from none in the 1960s to 27 percent in one journal and 
11 percent in all five periodicals. In the more specialized subdisciplinary 
organs of social scientific history, the trend was similar and the 
analogous figures markedly higher. Mammoth historical data banks 
and large samples of historical statistics were drawn and made available 
to the general scholarly community. Indeed, machine-readable data from 
elec tions, legislative roll calls, censuses, city directories, wills, 
family reconstitution studies, and o ther sources has come on-line, as it 
were, far faster than historians can analyze it. At least several 
hundred historians have gone through introductory statistics courses in 
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graduate schools or in special sunnner ins titutes. Mos t  departments which 
train doctoral s tudents now have at leas t a token "quantif ier," and a few 
encourage their s tudents to take more advanced theory and methods courses 
in other department s  (Kousser, 1980), 
It would be wrong, however, to represent the 1970s as a t ime 
of triumph for cliomet rics, or to proj ec t these apparent trends 
confidently into the futur e .  His torians expect Thermidorian react ions, 
and some have already begun to dismiss quantification as no t much more 
than a passing fad or to speak of such alleged dangers as "the 
quantitative trap" (Stone, 1977, pp . 14, 29; Genovese and Genovese, 1976, 
pp. 210-11; Stearns, 1976, p .  250). Defections from the ranks, o f ten 
proclaimed with cons iderable fervor, as well as healthy if sometimes 
vituperative self-cri ticism within the counnunity o f  quantitative 
his torians have been seized on by long-time opponents as evidence of the 
imminent demise of the subdiscipline. Thus, two years o f  crit icism by 
cliometricians led one his torian to refer to Time on the Cross, the best 
known quantitative histo rical work of the decade, as "little more than 
an intellectual hoax" (Richard Sennet t, quoted in Shapiro, 1976, p. 202). 
"Softer" social s cientific approaches -- psychohistory, vaguely 
"Marxist" analyses of culture, "anthropological" s tudies of mentalities 
-- are currently voguish (Stout, 1975; S tone, 1977, p. 14). 
The academic recession, with its at tendant deep cuts in graduate 
programs and new faculty slo ts, has especially hurt newer specialties, 
social scientific history among them. 
But impressionis tic surveys of s cholarly public opinion are 
inadequate tests of the value of such a bundle of approaches as social 
sc ientific history, and an uncertain guide to its fate. One might 
proj ect three alternative futures for social s cience his tory: relat ive 
autonomy from the res t of the history profession, but with sufficient 
st rength to maintain a viable research tradit ion; int egration with 
more traditional his to ry; and decline and disappearance, probably 
involving the absorption o f  each cliome tric subcult ure into its adjacent 
social s cientific dis c ipline, On the basis of current definitions of 
the field and the quality of recent work, what are the auguries? 
There is no consensus at this time on a description or even a 
name for the obj ect of our concern, Donald Mccloskey has posed perhaps 
the most crisp and pugnacious definition: "A cliometrician is an economis t  
applying economic theory (usually s imple) to his torical facts (not always 
quantitative) in the interes t of history (not economics) " (Mccloskey, 
1978, p. 15) . 
There are only f ive things wrong with this definition . First, 
s ince it is o ften difficult to dis tinguish economic from polit ical or 
social historians in topics, methods, or the invocation o f  theory, why 
should any of them escape the chiding monicker of "cliometrician?" 
Second, the question of which segment of economic theory to apply to a 
particular historical issue is somet imes unclear or cont es ted (Ransom 
and Sutch, 1979, pp. 65-7), some economic his torians use theories from 
other disciplines (Easterlin, in Tilly, 1978), and noneconomic 
cliometricians o ften draw upon social s ciences other than economics . 
Third, for some of the mos t  important topics in economics, for example, 
growth, the prime data source is historical, and economis t s  in s uch 
fields often examine historical sources in the interes t s  of economics 
as much as of his tory (e. g . ,  Kuznets, 1968) . Likewise , his torical 
sociology or political science is o ften conducted in the interes ts o f  
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both history and the o ther discipline {e . g. ,  Wallers tein, 1974; 
Burnham, 1970). Fourth, there j us t  may not be any part of neoclass ical 
economic theory which is applicable to certain earlier periods, s ince, 
according to North, that theory gives s light a ttention to ideology, the 
formation of and changes in tastes, and alterations in the underlying economic 
constraints which determine the s tructure of economies (North, 1978). 
In other words, in changed and changing t imes, theory may misguide . 
Fifth, if the concept of theory is broadened to include abs tractions 
from other social scientific disciplines or from o ther economic churches 
(Marxist, ins t itutionalist), how can a theory-based definition dis t inguish 
economic his tory from, s ay, psychohis tory or the casual use of "theories" 
by persons whom nearly everyone would call mainstream historians ?4 Thus,
a definition t ied solely to "theory" is either too narrow or too broad. 
Neither "neoclassical economic history" nor "social s cience his tory" 
will quite do as a t itle for the field . 
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What, then, about a concentration on method ? After all, one 
of the firs t tags for post-1960 economic history was "econometric 
his tory" (Fogel, in Fogel and Engerman, 1971, p. 2), and many refer to 
,,6 the larger field as "quant itative history . There are two chief 
difficulties with this t itle.  Firs t, his torians, part icularly economic 
his to rians , have always counted things and have often presented data in 
tabular form o r  subjec ted it to at least crude statistical tes t s .  The 
cont emporary French "serial his tory" emphas izes counting , but seems 
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vas t ly different from American cliomet rics (Furet, 1971 ; Fors ter, 1978). 
The adj ective "quantitative," therefore, fails to dis tinguish the new 
from the old economic his tory and confuses the use of numerical data 
merely to describe from its employment in tes ting explicit models . 
Second, some important work in cliometrics involves sketching out, 
refining, and crit icizing theories and their applicability to particular 
topics or areas (e . g . ,  Swanson and Williamson, in Schnore, 1975; Goldin, 
1979; Reid, 1979; Temin, 1979; Wright, 1979) .  Such exercises may be 
expressed wholly in prose or may involve mathemat ics, but they s eldom 
contain much empirical data or statistical analysis. Yet they remain 
too int egral a part of the process of the field ' s  development to be 
excluded from it by definition. 
Should one, then, draw the l ine between "scientific" or 
"analytical" and "traditional" history, as Fogel does in a recent paper 
(Fogel, 1979b) , thereby thrusting himself into the unlikely company of 
Jacques Barzun (1974)? I think not, for, firs t, the attributes o f  
"scientific" history, at least a s  Fogel lis t s  them, describe a much 
broader spectrum of historians and historical works than mos t  would 
include under any o ther of the proposed rubrics. For instance, the "Jim 
Crow thesis" of C .  Vann Woodward, one of the his torians Fogel labels 
"traditional , "  seems to me to meet nearly all of Fogel1s t ests for 
"scientific" his tory (Woodward, 1968). It is based on an exp licit 
theoretical proposition (s ummed up in the contradiction to William Graham 
Sumner ' s  slogan "fo lkways make s tateways"); focuses on collectivities o f  
people and , at least potentially , o n  recurring events (the ebbs and flows 
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of racism) ; may draw on quantitative as well as "literary" evidence (see 
Kousser , 1974) ; can be verified or d isconfirmed (see Woodward , 197 1 ,  
chapter 9); and has certainly been controversial . If Woodward writes 
well enough to coDDI1and an extensive lay audience,  that is hardly a grave 
enough sin for which to exclude him from the band of "scientis ts . "  
Second , the proposed tags are hardly value-free -- the modern world's 
distaste for traditional ways and i ts respect for science or for analytical 
minds canno t escape the most obtuse observer -- and ,  in fac t ,  the names may 
express a standard to rally around or a se t o f  likes and dislikes as 
much as they do a definition. 
Since no one name seems entirely satisfactory , and since 
arguments about definitions pall rapidly , perhaps the best solution is 
to combine them. Quantification is certainly an important distinguishing 
feature : nearly every important set of ideas in the subdiscipline can 
be expressed in mathematical symbols or tested with statistics , and an 
emphasis on quant ification excludes psychohistory and a great deal o f  
conventional history. But it is numbers and symbols wedded to explicit , 
logically consis tent , and fairly broad hypotheses or full-blown theories 
which divides the older and newer approaches . 7 That is to say , it is
the combination of quantification and theory which is central . And 
nearly all the theory and statis tical methods have been and will no 
doubt cont inue to be imported from other social s ciences . So unwieldy a 
compos i te definition is perhaps bes t expressed in an acronym , QUAnt itative 
Social Scientific His tory (QUASSH), which also reflects the rather 
argumen tative s tyle of its prac titioners.8 
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Judging the health of an adolescent is no easy task. We 
expect to see growth , a deepening of experience ,  signs o f  maturity , but 
the youth may s t il l  be awkward , somewhat raw , his development uneven, A 
review o f  three areas drawn respectively from political , social , and 
economic history confirms that QUASSH is a normally developing 
adolescent .  I h 11 f s a ocus on the so-called theory of crit ical 
elect ions , recent analyses of past geographic mobil ity , and treatments 
of the pos tbellum Southern U . S .  economy . 
The no t ion of critical elections had two sources. v. o. Key , 
Jr. , a political s cientist , noticed pat t erns of stability broken by 
sharp and steep d iscont inui t ies in New England election returns , and ,  a 
few years later , Lee Benson applied the concept of business cycles to 
New York elections (Key , 1955; Benson , 1961) . The idea which bo th 
shared was that voters usually went along following ingrained patterns 
of behavio r ,  nearly always voting for candidates of the same party in 
successive contests , until either a growing pattern of strains produced 
a political earthquake or an extra-polit ical cataclysm such as an 
economic depres s ion forced electors from their habitual pol i tical 
abodes , American political history was sliced into five normal periods 
by the p res idential elections of 1800 , 1832 , 1860 , 1896 , and 1932 -- tha t  
is , b y  the coalescence of nat ional parties and the triumph of the 
Jeffersonians , the emergence of mass politics inspired by Jackson , the 
sect ional split over slavery , and two depressions (Chambers and Burnham , 
1967). 
As a way to organize data and inspire research , t he concept 
of crit ical elec tions has been of cons iderable importance to political 
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history. It has focused much closer at tention on election returns than 
historians p reviously gave those invaluable records of mass behavio r 
and political attitudes, and encouraged s tudents to learn and employ 
more sensitive s tatistical techniques in their analysis and to think 
more deeply about long-run changes in the electoral process (see, e . g . ,  
Burnham, 1965) . Yet i t  is severely flawed on five counts . In the firs t 
place, it contains no well worked-out microtheoretical mechanism, though 
some could be proposed. Why should an individual elector continue to 
vot e  the same way in s uccessive "normal" elections, what causes voters to 
shift mass ively at one time rather than another, and when many do shift, 
why don ' t  all move uniformly? In o ther words, what, in this theory, 
motivates various groups o f  individual vot ers to act as they do at 
various times? In the second place, the theory is operationally vague . 
How large a shift has to occur to make an election "critical"? How much 
backing and f iling can go on before a "stable" period has to be ruled 
"uns table"? Suppose successive elections produce "large" shifts, but for 
apparently different reasons, or suppose there is no trend in the party 
balance in two or more upheavals. Does calling these sets of elections a 
"critical period" do more than disguise our ignorance? In the third 
place, there are difficulties in the choice of s tatistical methods . Mos t 
inves tigators have used correlations, regressions, or the analysis o f  
variance to uncover trends and break points i n  a time s eries o f  elections. 
Even ignoring the "ecological fallacy," which haunts the correlation of 
returns from different areas, the techniques have led to several p roblems: 
one index may lead to dif ferent conclusions than ano ther; s ince areal 
election returns are usually highly correlated from year to year, the 
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criterion of s tatis tical s ignificance is of lit tle help in determining 
dif ferences in the level of association; and none of the techniques, at  
leas t as employed by historians so far, allows the observer simultaneously 
to discover the extent of shifts and the make-up of the groups who change 
their behavior. In the fourth place, the connec tion between critical 
elections and policy, which is, after all, presumably the chief end o f  
electoral activity, i s  vague (Burnham, 1970 , pp. 175-93; Lichtman, 1976, 
pp . 339-41) . How soon after a crit ical election should policy be expected 
to be altered? What determines the extent and direct ion of the policy 
realignment? How and why does policy in areas of major concern to the 
electorate move about during eras of electoral s tability? In the 
fif th place, the data increasingly s eems not to fit the theory . Returns 
from many s tates do not follow national trends (Benson and Silbey, 1978) 
or vary widely from state to s tate ( Fischer, 1964). "Normal" periods 
appear a good deal less cons tant than seems consis tent with the notion of 
a neat s table-unstable dichotomy (Benson, Silbey, and Field, 1978, p. 88) . 
"Critical elections" get s trung out into "critical periods" as long as 
twelve years, and even then, close observers f ind that alignments on either 
side of a critical period resemble each other more than they do elections 
within the critical period (Shover, 1974; Lichtman, 1979, pp . 206-07) . 
Clearly, the notion of critical elections by now raises more problems 
than it settles, and his torians need a new synthet ic idea, 
If a perusal of vo ting returns led Key and Benson to the 
concept of critical elections, it was Stephan Thernstrom's conning of 
indi�idual census and city d irectory entries which opened up the problem 
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of geographic mobility. Engaged in a study of his torical social mobility 
in Newburyport, Massachuset ts, Thernstrom (1964, pp. 85-90, 96) found 
that he los t a considerable portion of his subj ects from decadal census 
to census, Plausible death rates could account for only a small portion 
of them; name changes were minimized, s ince he traced only male heads of 
households; misrecording of names might explain a few more, but the 
town was small and Thernstrom was careful and thorough. The conclus ion 
became inescapable that many people -- perhaps as many as two-thirds of 
the working-class in ten years -- had simply moved away . 
Thernst rom ' s  s triking finding led iounediately to a rash of 
similar s t udies organized around the ques t ions o f  the extent of 
geographic mobility and the reasons for moving (Thernstrom, 1973, pp. 
222-26). Were residents o f  Newburyport singularly mobile? Did the 
extent of geographic mobility vary with s ize of place, region, length 
of settlement of the area by Europeans, prosperity of the place of 
residency, or chronological time? Within each area, did the proportion 
of movers and s tayers vary by race, ethnicity, wealth, education, or 
occupation? Could computer programs be developed which would accurately 
link entries in different years, even of those persons with common names ? 
Often collaborat ing, nearly always employing a computer to simplify tasks 
and avoid boredom, certainly aware of each o ther ' s  work, a large number of 
his torians at tacked these issues. In general, they found decadal mobility 
cons istently high -- usually from 40 to 60 percent -- in all types o f  
areas and throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries i n  America, 
Stability varied pos itively with social s tatus in the nineteenth century, 
and somewhat negatively, though perhaps not linearly, in the era since 
1945. Adequate record linkage programs were wri tten. 
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Yet advances in the field have slowed in recent years, and 
several major problems remain. First, there has been no at tempt to 
construct or to import from other discipl ines a rigorous and extensive 
model of why individuals move. Second, no one to my knowledge has 
solved the mystery of how to determine where they went. Was there, as 
Thernstrom has suggested, a "permanent floating proletariat" in the 
nineteenth century (1973, p .  42)? Third, despite the application of 
sophis t icated mul t ivariate s tatistical t echniques to the analys is of 
social mobility in sociology (Duncan, 1979; Goodman, 1979, and earlier 
works c ited there), there have been few attempts by historians to 
disentangle the correlates o f  mobility in order to determine whether the 
relation o f  ethnicity, say, to geographic mobility was real or spurious 
(but see Weber and Boardman, 1977). Fourth, it has been suggested that 
the extent of mobility has been overest imated because the areas s tudied 
have been so small, that if the territory investigated were extended to 
include outlying suburbs, adjoining counties, perhaps even s tates, the 
measured rate of mobil i ty would diminish considerably . Scholars who 
make such an argument, of course, believe implicitly that relatively 
short moves shouldn't be treated as equivalent to longer moves. Yet 
such an extension would make the s tudy of mobility incredibly t ime-
consuming, even using indexed census material . Furthermore, the 
difficulty of linking records would become increasingly severe as the 
area expanded, and it would become much more difficult to explain these 
phenomena sat isfac torily, for researchers would need a theory and a set 
of operational definitions which not only accounted for the decision to 
move or s tay, but also for the decision to relocate at different dis tances 
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and in different types of surroWldings, Perhaps this theoretical 
challenge is implicit even in the current formulation of the research 
task, but at tacking the full-blown problem does seem to require an 
unreasonably large step forward . Fifth, the implications of the reported 
degree of spatial mobility for social history haven ' t  been entirely 
elucidated, and for political and economic history, haven ' t  been faced . 
In a "humanistic" sense, what did this apparently massive churning of 
humanity mean in an individual ' s  or family ' s  l ife? 
The unfortunate consequences of the compartmentalization of 
the sub-fields of QUASSH can be illustrated by a brief view of recent 
work on the postbellum Southern economy, centering on the most ambitious 
and provocative study, Ransom and Sutch 's  One Kind o f  Freedom (1977). 
There are two main questions in the economic history of the South from 
1865 to the end of the nineteenth century: What accounts for the regional 
growth rate, compared to some ideal ; and what explains the distribution 
of income and wealth, again in relation to some hypo thetical state? 
Focusing on a five-state "Cotton South, " Ransom and Sutch (hereafter "R & S ") 
claim that the rate of growth was slow, relative to the s tates outside 
of the South, because flawed Southern financial institutions "locked in" 
tenant farmers to the "overproduc tion" of cot ton. While recognizing 
that emancipation increased black incomes and welfare -- that is, 
income plus t ime spent not raising crops -- R & S contend that the 
increase was less than it would have been had the South not "uniformly" 
adopted the institution of sharecropping , and had not farmers purchased 
some portion of their food and other supplies on credit from small-time 
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merchants who held local territorial monopol ies. Southern economic 
lethargy , they assert, did no t result from Civil War destruc t ion, the 
e ffects of which were quickly repaired, nor was the racial difference in 
income received the product of governmental action, of pure racial 
discrimination, or of the forces of competitive capitalism. Both in a 
micro and in a macroeconomic sense Southern farmers were "locked in" to 
too much cot ton and too little prosperity until the arrival of that 
anomalous savior, the boll weevil. 
While R & S conduct ed prodigious and innovative research in 
quantified census and merchantile records, they largely ignored recent 
work in political and social history, failed to validate satisfactorily 
their controversial choices between economic models, and could have 
benefitted from a good dose o f  the concerns of traditional historians. 
Thus, they claim that blacks were unable to use polit ics to influence 
postwar economic arrangements because "soon" after enfranchisement, 
blacks were "effectively disenfranchised" (1977, p. 1). Yet studies 
by political historians demonstrate that blacks had a good deal of 
influence during Reconstruction and that they continued to participate 
in Southern polit ics in most states through the 1880s and, in several, 
until the turn of the century (Kousser, 1974) . Furthermore, crucial 
parts of their schema rest on assumptions about sharecropper geographic 
mobility , but R & S seem to be unaware of the social historians' s tudies 
of mobility and they make no attempt to char t the degree of mobil ity 
themselves. They contend, for one thing, that the tenure o f  sharecroppers 
was too insecure to provide them with an incentive to make farm 
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improvements, a condition which led logically to the continual deterioration 
of fixed agricultural capital (p . 101) . A finding that the rate of tenant 
farm-to-farm mobility was low, however, would imply that tenants had 
de facto tenure, and would s everely undercut this contention. For another 
thing, they assert that one reason farmers couldn't switch from one 
furnishing merchant to another who offered bet ter terms is that the 
farmer would have to be concerned about being refused credit or even the 
right to make cash purchases from the first merchant if the second went 
out of business or was too far away to get to in an emergency (p, 128), 
A finding that tenant geographic mobility was high, so that ' croppers 
need not have been very concerned about next year ' s  buying arrangements, 
would cas t doubt on this argument. Mos t fundamentally, R & S's central 
proposition -- that local merchant monopolies locked farmers into "debt 
peonage" and an overconcentration on cot ton -- would be undermined if 
it were found that tenants moved from area to area often, for then 
tenants could seek out places where merchants or landlords would allow 
them to grow as much food and as little cot ton as they wished to. If 
there was some entry into the ranks of the merchants, and R & S don't 
deny that there was, newly es tablished merchants would bid for mobile 
cus tomers, farmers would not be bound to particular merchants, and 
9 competitive, not monopo ly prices would prevail . Note that while a 
finding of substantial farmer mobility would damage R & S's argument, a 
dis covery of immobility would not necessarily prove it, for it would be 
just as logical to assume that tenants or renters who s tayed put were 
sat isfied with their arrangements as it would to assume they were 
unhappy, hut compelled to stay because of deb ts. The empirical and 
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theoret ical ques tions thus come down to the same ones a s  in the rest of 
the geographic mobility l i terature -- what was the rate of movement and 
why did some people move and o thers s tay? 
R & S assert that the merchant-farmer relationship should be 
modeled as one of monopoly, ins tead of as monopolistic competition, free 
market competition, or the market plus racial discrimination, as o ther 
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economic his torians have contended (DeCanio, 1979; Higgs, 1977). 
Further, they pos tulate an obj ective function for every individual 
farmer which would lead to a crop mix which is not "socially optional" 
-- a condit ion difficult to square with conventional argwnents from 
neoclassical theory (Goldin, 1979; R & S, 1979), R & S believe that 
the typical applied economis t ' s  procedure -- pos it a model, apply it to 
data, see how well the results fit -- may mislead when there are no 
better apriori reasons to employ one model than another, and that 
scholars must choose between models by examining non-quantifiable 
evidence (Sutch, 1977, pp. 402-03). They therefore seek to j us t ify their 
preferred models by surveying "contemporary tes t imony. " The problem is 
that their survey is, perhaps unavoidably, incomplete -- they draw 
heavily on one non-random s ample from North Carolina in 1887 to 
generalize about the whole South for 45 years . It is also probably 
unrepresentative of the opinions of the poorest farmers, for tenants 
were apparently no t sough t out by the North Carolina reporters and 
seldom wrote to farm j ournals to express themselves on implicit interes t 
rates and the terms of their contracts with merchants. The opinions 
R & S quo te are therefore chiefly those of landholders and agricultural 
rcfo nners. Moreov1'r, the quotations sometimes do not show wha t R & S wish 
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to  prove. For instance, many of the stat ements dl•ct·ying the decline in 
farmer self-sufficiency appear to be as much concerned with regional 
as with the individual farmers ' self-sufficiency, while o thers s eem to 
reflect l i t tle more than a nostalgic desire for independence from the 
market, or the extraordinary conditions o f  the depression of the 1890s 
(R & S, 1977, pp. 151, 161-64), Perhaps a systematic treatment of the 
"literary" evidence would support the R & S models, but they have not 
performed it. 
Application o f  the traditional historian ' s  mode o f  thinking 
might also undercut R & S ' a  basically static model, which assumes, in 
effect, uniform fixed parameters from about 1870 to about 1900. While 
historians revel in variat ions (Landes, 1978), for instance in d ifferent 
tenure arrangements in sharecropping contracts, economists, t ied to s imple 
models, tend to asswne uniformity, or at leas t R & S do (e. g. , R & S, 1977, 
pp, 101-02). If the his torians ' standard procedure makes generalizat ion 
less likely and focuses too much on deviant cases, the economists ' may 
prove incorrect generalizations by assumption and put too little emphasis 
ll 1 on empirical evidence. In the instance, sharecropping may wel have
been more allocationally efficient in both the long and short run than 
R & S claim, and ' cropping contracts may have varied cons iderably over 
both space and time. The exis tence of possible variat ions is an emp irical 
ques tion, not one to be dodged by supposition, as they t end to do. In 
sum, although R & S have raised the study of pos tbellum Southern economic 
history to new levels, there is plenty of work which needs to be done on 
the subjec t by all types of historians before any particular picture of 
that economy can be fully accepted . 
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History is, indeed, different from the other social sciences, 
but it is less different than it us ed to be. By this time, QUASSH has 
produced so many fresh s t udies with importan t  implicat ions for exis t ing 
historical interpretations -- only a fraction of which are reviewed 
here -- that the subdiscipline can no longer be ignored by the pro fession, 
nor is it being ignored (see, e. g. , Fogel, 1975; Woodman, 1977 ; Kousser, 
1980). At the s ame t ime, devotees o f  QUASSH, I hope I have shown, 
neglec t mainstream his torical skills and the works of o ther QUASSH and 
non-QUASSH historians only to the detriment of their own work. While 
they mus t  retain their interest and keep up with the latest l iterature 
in allied non-his torical fields, QUASSH his torians cannot profitably 
segregate themselves into ghettoes labeled "economic, " "social," or 
''political" history, or even into a consolidated subdivision combining 
quantitative workers in all three. They cannot return to their 
individual social s cientific homes and retain their effectiveness as 
students of the past. The only choice which will maximize welfare is 
for the immigrants to retain the ethnic cus toms of their social 
scientific homelands, yet at the same t ime fully integrate into history. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Compare the initial popular and scholarly reac tion to Fogel and
Engerman ' s  Time on the Cross (1974) with that to the "social savings
controversy" (see Fogel, 1979a) or to Ransom and Sutch' s One Kind of
Freedom (1977) . All three aroused controversy among economic 
his torians, but only TOTC, whose conclusions ran counter to current
opinion on many points, was much noticed by the general his torical
cormnunity . See Temin, 1979, p .  57 . 
2 .  Of course, historians, especially economic historians, have always 
counted or used implicitly quantitative phrases s uch as "more," "less," 
"most," etc, But the rapid development in social science theory and 
statist ical methods in the postwar era and the continuing revolution 
in data processing technology have given a qualitatively different 
cas t to quantitative his tory in the last two decades . 
3. Por a s imilar response, see Woodman, (1972) . The "sec tarian" epithet
is in widespread use .  See, e . g . , Hexter, (1972), p .  386 . 
4. It is pos sible that the addition of the modifiers "explicit" or
"sel f-conscious" to "theory" might s ave a theory-based definition , 
(Davis , in Taylor and Ellsworth, 1971, p p .  106-07; Landes and 
Tilly, 1971, page 10), I see three difficulties with this approach: 
Pirst, the "theory" may be so vague as not to yield any very precise 
predictions . Second, a theory may be advert ised, but not really be 
integral to the attached analys is , Third, a theory or generalization 
may be used self-consciously, but implicitly -- I s uspect that nearly 
every scholar does so from time to time to avoid tedious repetitions 
or needless dis traction of his audience . 
5 ,  Obviously the "new" names ("new economic," "new political," "new 
social" his tory) are unsatis factory, for first, the initial innovations 
occurred a generation ago and s econd, the titles convey l ittle 
informat ion. 
6, Two o f  the first introductions to the sub-field emphas ized the word 
"quantitative" in their subtitles . Those titles did not contain the 
words "theory," "social science," or any variants. See Price and 
Lorwin, 1972; Aydelotte, Bogue, and Fogel, 1972 . Similarly, the 
titles and subject-matter of two major articles in The American 
Historical Review emphas ize the "quantitative" theme at the expense 
of "Theory . "  Aydelotte, 1971, chapter 2; Erickson, 1975 . 
7 .  For fuller treatments o f  the links between methods and theory and 
the necessity for political historians to form more fully adumbrated 
and logical theories, see Kousser, 1976 and Kousser, 1979. 
8 .  The acronym i s  the invention o f  my colleague Daniel J .  Kevles, at 
the end of a long day, 
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9, No economis t could seriously contend that the 8000 country s tore 
owners of 1880 could collude to exploit tenants. I f  one merchant 
were profiting above the market rate, it would always be in the 
interest of another merchant, perhaps a new entrant in the area, to 
shave prices or contract terms a bit in order to draw in cus tomers. 
Once this happened, and the fact became known and surely such 
valuable information would travel rapidly on market or court day, 
when farmers thronged to country towns o ther merchants would have 
to match the firs t merchant's bid, and so on and on until profits 
were driven to "normal" levels, unless the farmers were hopelessly 
tied to part icular merchants . If there was local merchant collusion 
in one place, then poor tenants with few worldly possessions could 
easily move to areas without such cartels. 
10. This situation reflec ts on McCloskey's definition of cliometrics as
the application of economic theory, for here it is precisely the
question of which of several competing economic theories applies
best which is at issue. The choice between theories which plausibly 
apply is an empirical matter.
11 . I do no t mean to imply that economis ts always avoid dealing with 
messy cases or that his torians never openly generaliz e ,  or tha t 
ei ther tendency is necessarily bad . I do believe tha t each group 
has a different tendency, and that in this work R & S strike the 
balance too far toward the side of generalization by assumption. 
28 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
AHA (1980), Guide to Departments of History ,  1979-80. Washington: 
American His to rical Association. 
Alexander ,  T.  B.  (1967), Sectional S t ress and Party S t rength: A Study 
of Roll-Call Vo ting Patterns in the United S tates House of Representatives , 
1836-1860, Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press . 
Alexander , T .  B .  and Beringer,  R .  E. (1972), Anatomy o f  the Confederate 
Congress: A S t udy of the Influences of Member Characteris t ics on 
Legislative Voting Behavior ,  Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 
Aydelot t e ,  W. 0, (1963), "Voting Pat terns in the Brit ish House of Commons 
in the 1840s," Comparative Studies in Society and His tory, 5, 134-163. 
Aydelot t e ,  W. 0, (1971), Quantification in His tory� Reading, Mass. : 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Co, 
Aydelo tte , W. O . , Bogue , A .  G, , and Fogel , R. W. (1972), The Dimensions 
of Quantitat ive Research in His tory . Princeton: Princeton University 
Pres s .  
Barzun , J, (1974), Clio and the Doctors, Psycho-His tory, Quanto-
His tory, and His tory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Benson , L. (1961), The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy: New York as a 
Tes t Case, Princeton: Princeton Unive rs i ty Press . 
Henson, L. (1972), "An Approach to the Scientific Study of Pas t Public 
Opinion,". In L. lle nson, Scientific Study of History. Philadelphia: 
J. II. Lippincot t  and Co, 
29 
Benson , L .  (1972), "Research Problems in American Polit ical Histo riography," 
In L. Benson, Toward the Scientific Study o f  His tory ,  Philadelphia: 
J .  B. Lippinco t t  Co, Pp, 3-80, 
Benson , L . , Silbey , J, II,, and Field , P. F .  (1978), "Toward a Theory o f  
Stability and Change i n  American Vo t ing Patt erns: New York Stat e ,  1792-
1970." In J, II. Silbey, A. G .  Bogue and W. II. Flanigan (Eds, ) ,  The 
History of American Electoral Behavio r ,  Princeton: _Princeton University 
Pres s . 
Bogue , A. G. (1968), "United States: The 'New ' Polit ical His tory , "  The 
Journal of Contemporary History ,  3, 5-28. 
Burnham , W. D .  (1965), "The Changing Shape of the American Political 
Universe , "  American Political Science Review , 59, 7-28. 
Burnham , W. D. (1970), Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American 
Poli t ics . New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 
Chambers , W. N . , and Burnham , W. D .  (1967), The American Party Systems: 
Stages of Pol i tical Development .  New York: Oxford Univers ity Press, 
Clubb , J, M.  , and Allen , II. W, (1967), "Computers and His torical Studies , "  
Journal o f  American His tory , 54, 599-607. 
Conrad, A . ,  and Meye r ,  J, In R, W. Fogel and S .  L. Engerman, 
(1971), The Reinterpretation of American Economic His tory .  New york: 
Harper and Row. Pp.  342-61. 
30 
Curti, M .  (1959), The Making of an American Community: A Case S t udy 
of Democracy in a Frontier County . Stanford : Stanford University Press .
Davis, L .  E .  (1971), "Specification, Quantification and Analysis in 
Economic History . "  In G .  R. Taylor and L. F .  Ellsworth, Approaches 
to American Economic History .  Charlot tesville: University Press of 
Virginia, Pp . 106-20. 
De Canio, S .  J. (1979), Review o f  One Kind of Freedom. 
History Review, 2d Series, 32, 455-57 . 
The Economic 
Demos, J .  (1969), A Little Commonwealth : Family Life in Colonial P lymouth . 
New York : Oxford University Press . 
Duncan, o. D .  (1979), "How Destination Depends on Origin in the 
Occupational Mobility Table . "  American Journal of Sociology 84, 793-803. 
Easterlin, R .  A .  (1978), "The Economics and Sociology of Fertility : A 
Synthesis . "  In Tilly, C . ,  Historical Studies of Changing Fert ility . 
Princeton : Princeton University Press . P p .  57-133 . 
Erickson, C .  (1975), "Quantitative History . "  American Historical Review, 
80. 351-65 . 
Fogel, R .  W. (1967), "The Specification Problem in Economic History," 
The Journal of Economic History, 27, 283-308. 
Fogel, R.  W. (1971), "The New Economic His tory: Its Findings and Methods . "  
In R. W. Fogel and S. L. Engerman, The Reinterpretation of American 
Economic History. New York: Harper and Row, Pp. 1-12 . 
Fogel, R .  W. (1975), "The Limits o f  Quantitative Methods in History . "  
American Historical Review 80, 329-50 . 
Fogel, R. W .  (1979), " ' Scientific ' History and Traditional History . "  
Mimeograph, Harvard Universit y .  
31 
Fogel, R. W. (1979a), "Notes on the Social Saving Controversy . "  Journal 
of Economic History, 39, 1-54 . 
Fogel, R .  W., and Engerman, s. L .  (1967), Reinterpretation : Purdue 
Faculty Papers in Economic History, 1956-1966. Homewood, Illinois : 
Dorsey Press . 
Fogel, R .  W . , and Engerman, S .  L. (1974), Time on the Cross, Vol. 1: 
The Economics of American Negro Slavery; Vol. 2: Evidence and Methods : 
A Supplement .  Boston : Little, Brown . 
Formisano, R .  P .  (1971), The Birth of Mass Political Parties : Michigan, 
1827-1861 . Princeton : Princeton University Press . 
Forster, R. (1978), "The Achievements of the Annales School . "  Journal 
of Economic History 38, 58-76 . 
Furet, F .  (1971), "Quantitative His tory . "  In F .  Gilbert and S. R.  
Graubard, (Eds . ), His torical Studies Today . New York : W. W. Norton 
& Co. , Inc . 
Genovese, E. F . , and Genovese, E .  D .  (1976), "The Polit ical Crisis of 
Social History . '' Journal of Social His tory 10, 205-20 . 
32 
Goldin, C. (1979) , " ' N '  Kinds of Freedom : An Introduction to the Issues . "  
Explorat ions in Economic History 16 , 8-30 . 
Goodman, L. A. (1979 ) , "Multiplicative Models for the Analysis o f  
Occupational Mobility Tables and Other Kinds of Cross-Classification 
Tables . "  American Journal o f  Sociology 84 , 804-819. 
Greven, P. (1970) , Four Generations : Population , Land and Family in 
Colonial Andover. Ithaca : Cornell Univers i ty Pres s .  
Hackney, F .  S .  (1969) , Populism to Progress ivism in Alabama . Princeton : 
Princeton Univers ity Press, 
Hexter, J. H. (1972) ,  "Fernand Brandel and the Monde Brandelien . "  
Journal o f  Modern History, 4 4 ,  480-539. 
Higgs, R. (1977 ) ,  Competition and Coercion : Blacks in the American 
Economy ,  1865-1914 . New Yo rk : Cambridge University Pres s . 
Holt, M. F. (1969) , Forging A Maj o rity : The Formation of the Republican 
Party in Pittsburgh , 1848-1860 . New Haven : Yale University Pres s .  
Key, V. O . ,  J r .  (1955) , "A Theory o f  Critical Elections . "  Journal o f  
Politics 17 , 3-18 . 
Kleppner, P .  (1970) , The Cross of Culture : A Social Analysis of 
Midwestern Politics , 1850-1900. New York : The Free Press . 
Kousser, J, M. (1974 ) , The Shaping of Southern Polit ics : Suffrage 
Res t riction and the Establishment of the One-Party South , 1880-1910 . 
New Haven: Yale Univers ity Pres s .  
Kouss er, J ,  M .  (1976) , "The ' New Political His tory' : A Methodological
Critique . "  Reviews in American History, 4 ,  1-14 . 
Kousser, J ,  M. (1979) , "His tory - Theory 
His tory, 7 ,  157-62 . 
? "  Reviews in American 
Kousser, J, M. (1980) , "Quantitative Social Scient ific His tory . "  In 
33 
M. Kammen (Ed . ), The Pas t Before Us : Contemporary Historical Writ ing in 
the United S tates, Ithac a :  Cornell University Press, 
Kuznets, s .  (1968) , Toward a Theory of Economic Growth . New York : 
W. W. Norton . 
Landes, D .  (1978) , "On Avoiding Babel . "  Journal of Economic History 
38 , 3-11 . 
Landes, D .  and Tilly, C .  (1971 ) , History as Social Science. Englewood 
Cliffs : Prentice-Hal l .  
Lemon, J ,  T. (1972) ,  The Bes t Poo r Man' s Country : A Geographical S tudy 
of Early Southeastern Pennsylvania . Bal t imore : Johns Hopkins Univers ity Pres s . 
Lichtman, A .  J, (1976) , "Crit ical Election Theory and the Reality of 
American Presidential Elec t ions. " American Historical Review 81 , 317-52 . 
Lichtman, A .  J .  (1979) , Prejudice and the Old Politics: The Presidential 
Election of 1928 , Chapel Hill :  University of North Carolina Press . 
Lockridge, K .  A. (1970) , A New England Town : The Firs t Hundred Years. 
New York : W. W. Norton & Co . 
Main, J. T .  (1965) ,  The Social Structure of Revolut ionary America . 
Prince ton : Princeton Univers ity Press.
Mccloskey, D. N. (1978) , "The Achievements of the Cliometric School . "  
Journal o f  Economic History 38, 23. 
North, D. C. (1978) , "Structure and Performance : The Task of Economic 
History. " Journal of Economic Literature 16, 963-78.  
Price, J . M . ,  and Lopwin, V.  R.  (19 7 2 ) ,  The Dimensions o f  the Pas t :  
Materials , Problems , and Opportunities for Quantitative Work in His tory. 
New Haven, Conn. : Yale Univers ity Press . 
Ransom, R. L. and Sutch, R. (197 7 ) ,  One Kind of Freedom: The Economic 
Consequences of Emanc ipation . Cambridge, England : Camb ridge Univers ity 
Press . 
Ransom, R. and Sutch, R. (19 7 7a),  "Credit Merchandising in the Pos t­
Emancipation South : St ructure, Conduct and Performance. " Explorations 
in Economic History 16, 64-89. 
Reid, J. D . ,  Jr. (1979),  "White Land, Black Labor, and Agricultural 
S tagnat ion . The Causes and Effects o f  Sharecropping in the Postbellum 
South . "  Explorations in Economic History 16, 31-55 . 
Roths tein, M. et al . (1970) , "Quantification and American History : an 
Assessment . "  In H. J. Bass (Ed. ) ,  The S tate of American His tory. 
Chicago : Quadrangle Books. Pp.  298-329. 
35 
Sco t t , J ,  W. (1974) , The Glassworkers o f  Carmaux : French Cra ft smen and 
Political Action in a Nineteenth Century City .  Cambridge : Harvard 
Unive rsity Press. 
Shapiro, G. (1976 ) ,  "Prospects for a Scientific Social His tory : 1976 . "  
Journal o f  Social History 10, 196-204. 
Shover, J ,  L .  (1974), "The Emergence of a Two-Party Sys tem in Republican 
Philadelphia, 1924-1936 . "  Journal of American History 60, 985-1002 .  
Silbey, J ,  H. (196 7 ) ,  The Shrine o f  Party : Congressional Vot ing 
Behavior, 1841-1852 . Pittsburgh : Univers ity of Pittsburgh Press. 
Stearns, P. N. (1976 ) ,  "Coming of Age . "  Journal o f  Social History 10, 
246-55. 
Stone, L. (1977) , "His tory and the Social Sciences in the Twent ieth 
Century . "  In C .  F. Delzell, The Future o f  History. Nashville:  
Vanderbilt Univers ity Press, Pp.  3-42. 
Stout , H. S .  (1975) ,  "Culture, Structure and the ' New ' Histo ry :  A 
Crit ique and An Agenda. " Computers and the Humanities 9 ,  213-30 . 
Sutch, R. (19 7 7 ) ,  "Frontiers of Quantitative Economic History, Circa 
1975. " In M. D. Intrilligator (Ed . ) , Front iers of Quant it a t ive Economics, 
Vol . 3B.  Ams terdam : North-Holland Publishing Company . P p .  399-416 . 
Swanson, J .  A. and Williamson, J. G .  (1975 ) ,  "Firm Location and Op t imal 
City Size in American History . "  In L .  F. Schnore, The New Urban History :  
Quantitative Explorations by American Historians . Princeton : Princeton 
University P ress. Pp. 260- 73. 
36 
Swierenga, R. P. (1970) , "Clio and Computers : A Survey of Computerized 
Research in History . "  Computers and the Humanities 5, 1-21. 
Temin , P. (1979), "Freedom and Coercion : Notes on the Analysis of Debt 
Peonage ,  i n  One Kind o f  Freedom." Explo rations in Economic His tory 
16, 56-63. 
Thernstrom , s. (1973), The Other Bostonians : Poverty and P rogress in the 
American Met ropolis , 1880-1970 . Cambridge : Harvard Univers ity Press. 
Therns t rom , S .  (1964), Poverty and Progress in a N ineteenth Cent ury 
City. Cambridge : Harvard University Press. 
Tilly , C. (1979), "Sociology , Meet History. " CRSO Working Paper No. 
193, University of Michigan. 
Wallerstein , I. (1974), The Modern World-System: Capitalis t Agriculture 
and the Origins of The European World-Economy in The Sixteenth Century .  
New York: Academic Press. 
Weber,  M. P. and Boardman , A. E. (1977), "Economic Growth and Occupational 
Mobility in Nineteenth Century Urban America : A Reappraisal." Journal of 
Social History 11, 5 2-74 . 
Woodman, H. (1972), "Economic History and Economic Theo ry : The New 
Economic History in America , "  Journal o f  Interdis ciplinary History, 3, 
323-50. 
Woodman, H. D .  (1977), "Sequal to Slavery : The New His to ry Views the 
Postb ellum South." ,Journal of Southern His tory 43, 523-54 , 
Woodward , C. V. (1968), "His tory and the Third Culture." Journal of 
Contemporary History 3, 23-3 6 .  
Woodward , C .  V. (1971), American Counterpoint :  Slavery and Racism in 
the North-South Dialogue . Boston : Little,  Brown. 
Woodward , C. V. (1974), The S t range Caree r of Jim Crow. New York : 
Oxford University P ress. 
Wright, G ,  (1979), "Freedom and the Southern Economy." Explorations 
in Economic History 16, 90-108 , 
3 7  
